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Carter: Montana Groundwater Law

MONTANA GROUNDWATER LAW IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
John B. Carter*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Groundwater is a poorly understood natural resource in the law. In the
last few decades, Montana courts have embraced hydrologic reality by addressing the subject from a scientifically sound perspective. While much
still requires clarity, two twenty-first century Montana Supreme Court decisions have provided definition to divergent aspects of the law of groundwater. The first, Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Stults,1 con-

firmed that groundwater is a component of federal Indian reserved water
rights. The second, Montana Trout Unlimited v. Montana Department of
Natural Resources and Conservation,2 addressed the unitary nature of sur-

face water and groundwater. This article will briefly address the status of
federal and Montana state groundwater law prior to these decisions and then
discuss the two Montana Supreme Court decisions.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

Montana Water Law

The original Montana Constitution, enacted in 1889, addressed all aspects of water in a single sentence. It simply proclaimed that all water
appropriated within the state of Montana for beneficial use is deemed a
public use. 3 Before the enactment of the new Constitution in 1972, Montana had no centralized system for obtaining, recording, regulating, or adjudicating water usage in the state. 4 A person could simply divert and put
water to use, post a claim onsite, or record a use in the local territorial or
county office. 5 However, the common thread was, and continues to be, a
* John B. Carter is an attorney who has represented the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes
of the Flathead Indian Reservation on treaty rights, water rights and quality issues, jurisdictional disputes, environmental concerns, and governmental relations for many years.
1. ConfederatedSalish & Kootenai Tribes v. Stults, 59 P.3d 1093 (Mont. 2002) [hereinafter Ciotti
111].
2. Mont. Trout Unlimited v. Mont. Dept. of Nat. Resources & Conserv., 133 P.3d 224 (Mont.
2006).
3. Mont. Const. art II, § 15 (1889) (superseded on 1972 by Mont. Const. art. IX, § 3 (1972)).
4. Donald Duncan MacIntyre, The Adjudication of Montana's Waters-A Blueprintfor Improving
the Judicial Structure, 49 Mont. L. Rev. 211, 216 (1988).
5. Id.
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claimed adherence to the concept of "beneficial use" under the prior appro6
priation doctrine.
The 1972 Constitution significantly elaborated on the treatment of
water. The present provisions, contained in Article IX, Section 3, establish
four principles. First, all existing rights to water for beneficial uses as of
1973 are confirmed. 7 Second, all uses of water and attendant rights-of-way,
ditches, and reservoirs are deemed public uses. 8 Third, all water, including
"underground" water, is identified as the property of the State for the use of
the people. 9 Fourth, the Montana Legislature was directed to create a unitary system of recordation, of administering, adjudicating, and regulating
water rights. 10 Although already firmly established in federal law by 1972,
Indian or federally reserved water rights were not mentioned in the new
Constitution. 1 That omission facilitates divisive litigation involving the Indian Nations, non-Indian water users, the United States, and the State of
Montana. 12
In response to the 1972 constitutional mandate, the Montana Legislature enacted the Montana Water Use Act in 1973 ("Act"). 13 In a nutshell,
the Act created (1) a centralized system of recording and filing claims for
all water uses existing as of 1973,14 (2) a centralized system for obtaining
permits for new water uses initiated after 1973,15 and (3) a state-wide general adjudication system for all water rights claims for pre-1973 water
uses. 16
In the 1979 legislative session, the Legislature created a system no
other state has had the foresight to undertake. It amended the Act by creating the Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission ("Commis6. "Beneficial use" is defined at Montana Code Annotated Section 85-2-102(4) (2007).
7. Mont. Const. art. IX, § 3(1).
8. Id. at art. IX, § 3(2).
9. Id. at art. IX, § 3(3); but see Mont. ex rel. Greely v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes,
712 P.2d 754, 767 (Mont. 1985) (stating "Indian reserved waters are 'owned' by the Indians").
10. Mont. Const. art. IX,§ 3(4).
11. John B. Carter, Indian Aboriginal and Reserved Water Rights, An Opportunity Lost, 64 Mont.
L. Rev. 377, 377 (2003).
12. Id. at 382 (citing Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Mont., CV-81-147 (D. Mont.
1981); Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Flathead Irrigation & Power Project, 616 F. Supp.
1292 (D. Mont. 1985); Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Simonich, 29 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir.
1994); In the Matter of the Application for Beneficial Water Use Permit Nos. 66456-76L, Ciotti,
64988-G76L, Starner,923 P.2d 1073 (Mont. 1996) [hereinafter Ciotti 1];Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Clinch, 992 P.2d 244 (Mont. 1999) [hereinafter Ciotti II]; Ciotti III, 59 P.3d 1093; Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Clinch, BDV-2001-253 (1st Jud. Dist. Mont. 2001); Jt. Bd. of
Control of Flathead,Mission & Jocko Irrigation Dists. v. U.S., 832 F.2d 1127 (9th Cir. 1987); Jt. Bd. of
Control of Flathead,Mission & Jocko Irrigation Dists. v. U.S., 862 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1988)).
13. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 85-2-101 to 85-2-907.
14. Id. at § 85-2-221.
15. Id. at §§ 85-2-301 to 85-2-370.
16. Id. at §§ 85-2-201 to 85-2-282.
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sion"). 17 It vested the Commission with the authority to negotiate, rather

than adjudicate, the federally reserved and aboriginal water rights of Indian
tribes and of the various federal agencies claiming federally reserved water
rights in Montana. 18 Negotiation is not mandatory; a tribe or federal agency
may also choose to adjudicate its water rights. 19 However, all proceedings
to adjudicate a federally reserved water right are put on stay while negotiations are ongoing. 20 To date, five of the seven tribes with reservations, and
the vast majority of federal agencies with land holdings in Montana, have
negotiated water rights compacts, thus avoiding adjudication. 21 Interestingly, the Legislature has approved a water rights compact with the Northern Cheyenne Tribe that recognized a tribal right to groundwater under their
reservation. 22 This legislative recognition of tribal rights in groundwater
came years before an unsuccessful effort by the Montana Department of
Natural Resources and Conservation to defeat a tribal claim to a reserved
right to groundwater under the Flathead Indian Reservation (while those
23
tribes were negotiating with the Commission).
The Act is by definition a creature of state law. The Montana Constitution asserts that "all surface, underground, flood, and atmospheric waters
...

are the property of the state."'24 Montana has seven Indian reservations

within its borders, and each of those tribal nations possesses water rights
that are created under and defined by federal-not state-law.25 Historically, water rights deriving from federal law, whether owned by a tribe or a
branch of the U.S. government, were immune from state law. 26 The United

States possessed sovereign immunity from state court adjudication of its
federally reserved water rights, but that immunity was waived by Congres27
sional passage of the McCarran Amendment in 1952.28
17. Id. at §§ 2-15-212, 85-2-701 to 85-2-708.
18. Id. at § 85-2-702.
19. Mont. Code Ann. § 85-2-702.
20. Id. at § 85-2-217.
21. See id. at § 85-20-201. The compact with the Blackfeet Nation is for on-reservation water
rights only and, as of the date of this article, not yet finalized.
22. The compact with the Northern Cheyenne Tribe expressly recognizes a tribal right to groundwater under that Indian reservation. Northern Cheyenne-Montana Compact Ratified art. lI(B)(4); Mont.
Code Ann. § 85-20-301.
23. Ciotti III, 59 P.3d at 1096 (addressed in the introduction of this article and discussed herein).
24. Mont. Const. art. IX, § 3(3).
25. See e.g. Greely, 712 P.2d at 762 ("The basis for an Indian reserved water right is the treaty,
federal statute or executive order setting aside the reservation. Treaty interpretation and statutory construction are governed by federal Indian law.").
26. Colo. River Conserv. Dist. v. U.S., 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
27. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1952).
28. Ariz. v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Ariz., 463 U.S. 545, 564 (1983).
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On its face the McCarran Amendment did not address Indian water
rights. It simply waived the immunity of the United States and allowed
joinder:
1. for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or other
water source, or
2. for the administration of such rights, where it appears the United States is
the owner of or is in the process of acquiring water rights by appropriation
under State law, by purchase, by exchange, or otherwise, and the United
States is a necessary party to such suit. 2 9

This Western-states-inspired legislation was deemed necessary to allow each state to comprehensively adjudicate all claims to water within its
boundaries. 30 Prior to McCarran, federal and Indian water rights were adjudicated, if at all, exclusively in federal court. 31 Given the interrelated nature of water resources within a watershed, this jurisdictional dichotomy
frequently led to inconsistent or conflicting state and federal decrees, as
well as essentially unsolvable disputes between Indian and non-Indian
claims to water. 32 While the McCarran Amendment does not waive tribal
immunity from state courts, the United States Supreme Court held that the
United States, as trustee for Indian water, can be joined in a state water
adjudication and may quantify tribal rights in its trustee capacity (whether
or not the tribe participates). 33 This determination is based on the federal
trusteeship of Indian reserved and aboriginal water rights. 34 Therefore, un-

less tribes are willing to rely on the United States' representation of tribal
water rights, it behooves the tribes to commit to a limited waiver of immunity in adjudications of state water rights to prosecute and protect their own
claims to water. Failure to do so often results in diminished tribal water
35
rights.
B.

Indian Reserved and Aboriginal Water Rights

The field of Indian reserved water rights is one hundred years old and
still hotly disputed. It arose out of a water rights dispute on the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation in Montana in a case called Winters v. United
States.36 Winters is the foundation case for the Indian reserved water rights
29. 43 U.S.C. § 666(a).
30. Id.
31. Greely, 712 P.2d at 759; San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. at 566-567; Colo. River Water
Conserv. Dist., 424 U.S. at 820 n. 26.
32. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. at 569 (citing Colo. River Water Conserv. Dist., 424 U.S. at

819-820).
33. Nev. v. U.S., 463 U.S. 110, 142 (1983).
34. Id. at 144.
35. Id.
36. Winters v. U.S., 207 U.S. 561 (1908).
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doctrine. 37 The Winters Court concluded that, even though an Indian treaty
might be completely silent about water use, if the purposes for which the
reservation was created depend upon water, sufficient water to satisfy those
purposes are impliedly reserved to the Indians in perpetuity. 38 The Indian
Reservation's priority date for the water is generally the date of the treaty,
executive order, or act of Congress pursuant to which the reservation was
39
created.
Subsequent federal case law confirmed that when a tribe utilizes water
before the date of the treaty, the tribe also possesses "aboriginal rights" to
continue using that water regardless of the equities to junior users-frequently non-Indian settlers. 40 Aboriginal water rights are frequently manifested as in-stream flows necessary to preserve treaty-reserved fishing
rights. 4 ' Aboriginal water rights have a priority date of "time immemorial,"42 a fairly hard date to beat in Western water law.
Nearly eighty years after Winters, the Montana Supreme Court took a
hard look at the reserved and aboriginal water rights of one Montana Indian
Nation. 4 3 The Court in Montana ex relatione Greely v. Confederated Salish
and Kootenai Tribes determined, among other things, that federal law
trumped the Montana Constitution's assertion of state ownership of all
water within the state.4 4 Indian reserved water rights are owned by the
United States in trust for the tribes. 45 The Greely Court also found that the
purposes for which the Flathead Indian Reservation was created are quite
broad 4 6 and include irrigation, domestic, industrial, commercial, and instream flow needs for fish and wildlife, as well as future uses not yet devel47
oped.
Within the proscriptions of the McCarran Amendment, Indian reserved
and aboriginal water rights generally are not subject to the substantive laws
of the states; 48 state courts have a "solemn obligation to follow federal law"
for those limited state authorities allowed under the McCarran Amend49
ment.
37. William H. Veeder, Winters Doctrine Rights: Keystone of National Programsfor Western Land
and Water Conservation and Utilization, 26 Mont. L. Rev. 149, 150 (1965).
38. Winters, 207 U.S. at 577.
39. Greely, 712 P.2d at 767.
40. t. Bd. of Control of Flathead,Mission & Jocko IrrigationDists., 832 F.2d at 1132.
41. Id.; U.S. v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1408-1411 (9th Cir. 1983).
42. t. Bd. of Control of Flathead,Mission & Jocko IrrigationDists., 832 F.2d at 1131.
43. Greely, 712 P.2d 754.
44. Id. at 760, 766.
45. Id. at 767.
46. Id. at 763.
47. Id. at 765.
48. Id.
49. Greely, 712 P.2d at 766 (quoting San Carlos Apache Tribe, 436 U.S. at 571).
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The Evolution of the Treatment of Surface and Ground Water by
State Courts

The political treatment of groundwater encompasses a broad spectrum
of approaches. Historically, groundwater was viewed as a stand-alone resource used and managed as an independent substance without regard to
surface water. For example, Colorado distinguishes between groundwater
that is "underflow," "tributary," and "nontributary" to surface water.50 Arizona designates some, but not all, groundwater as "subflow." 51 Subflow is
comprised of waters that "slowly find their way ...

and are themselves a

part of the stream" and, therefore, subject to the prior appropriation doctrine. 52 Arizona also recognizes "percolating" water, which is supposedly
not connected to surface water and, therefore, subject to the "reasonable
use" doctrine, which effectively allows the owner of the surface to take
53
what he or she wants.
The Arizona Supreme Court has labeled these and similar distinctions
as an "artifice" that rests upon "hydrologic misconceptions. ' 54 The Gila
River Court was the first state supreme court to recognize that groundwater
under an Indian reservation can comprise one component of a tribe's Winters reserved water rights. The Gila River Court concluded:
[I]f the United States implicitly intended, when it established reservations, to
reserve sufficient unappropriated water to meet the reservations' needs, it
must have intended that reservation of water to come from whatever particular sources each reservation had at hand. The significant question for the
purpose of the reserved rights doctrine is not whether the water runs above or
below the ground but whether it is necessary to accomplish the purpose of the

reservation.

55

This conclusion was predicated on the Court's observation that most prior
appropriation jurisdictions have conformed "their law to hydrological reality" and have "abandoned the bifurcated treatment of ground and surface
waters and undertaken unitary management of water supplies. ' 56
While it is recognized that there are groundwater resources that exhibit
more or less connectivity to surface water supplies, there will inevitably be
some degree of hydrologic connectivity. The question is whether or not the
degree of connectivity is politically acceptable. As Professor Albert Stone,
50. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-82-101 (Lexis 2008).
51. In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River Sys. & Source, 989 P.2d
739, 743 (Ariz. 1993) [hereinafter Gila River].
52. Id. (quoting Maricopa Co. Mun. Water Conserv. Dist.No. 1 v. S.W. Cotton Co., 4 P.2d 369, 380
(Ariz. 1931)).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 747.
56. Id. at 744.
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an expert in Montana water law, wrote, "[S]urface waters contribute to
groundwaters, and vice versa: they are interrelated and their effects on one
another should be recognized through developments that tend to integrate
'57
surface and groundwater.
III.

A.

DEVELOPMENT OF GROUNDWATER LAW IN MONTANA

Surface and Groundwater Were Initially Treated as Unrelated
Natural Resources

Initially, Montana courts treated groundwater and surface water as unrelated resources subject to different laws. In Leonard v. Shatzer,58 the
Montana Supreme Court relied upon no prior Montana case law (and very
little other law) to decide an early groundwater case. At issue was the question of whether waters emanating from a spring, which subsequently sank
into the ground, contributed to the flow of a nearby down-gradient perennial stream. 59 The Court reviewed conflicting anecdotal (and no hydrologic) evidence and upheld a lower court determination that there was no
60
connection between the spring and the stream.
The plaintiff argued that merely because water from a spring reached a
stream by "subterranean" means, which are not well understood, does not
lessen the fact that it contributes to stream flow. 61 Therefore, interference
with the spring constituted interference with water rights derived from the
stream. 62 The defendant, on the other hand, argued that in the absence of a
clearly defined underground channel or other identifiable subterranean
water course, the law of surface water has repeatedly been found not to
63
apply.
While discussing the surface and groundwater theories of the time, the
Leonard Court chose not to decide the case on those principles. Rather,
noting substantial conflicting evidence, the Court punted, finding that the
case failed to "raise any distinction, of law or fact, as to percolating water
and channel water, subterranean or superficial; but the matter on this appeal
is simply the fact of whether or not the water of the spring in its natural
57. Albert W. Stone, Montana Water Law 43 (St. Bar of Mont. 1994).
58. Leonard v. Shatzer, 28 P. 457 (Mont. 1892).
59. Id. at 459.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 457. Symptomatic of the lack of clarity in early groundwater law, the Court failed to
clearly develop the several arguments in the case. That was left to the court reporter to address in the
syllabus included in the published opinion in the Montana Reporter (see Leonard v. Shatzer, 11 Mont.
422 (1892)).
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flow reached the creek at all."'64 Given the science of the times, letting the
trier-of-fact's conclusion stand might have been an understandable re65
sponse.
In Ryan v. Quinlan,6 6 the Court was asked to distinguish "seepage"
groundwater, deemed to possess a discernable underground channel or
stream, from "percolating" groundwater, which was deemed to lack any
discernible or well-defined underground flow channel and, therefore, was
not a tributary to any particular stream. 6 7 The water at issue flowed out of a
lake located up-gradient that was some distance from the headwaters of
Dempsey Creek. 6 8 After flowing from the lake in a well-defined channel, it
eventually subsided and produced no discernible channel for the remaining
distance to Dempsey Creek. 69 While the evidence was found to support a
hydrogeologic conclusion that the lake water could logically flow underground and contribute to the flow of Dempsey Creek, there was no visible
70
surface or subsurface connection.
Regardless, having asserted the lack of a connection between the waters of the lake and Dempsey Creek, an irrigator junior to surface water
claims on Dempsey Creek sought to augment his usage by asserting a right
to waters from the lake.7 1 He accomplished this by damming the lake and
diverting lake water into a newly-constructed ditch that carried this combined stored and diverted water to Dempsey Creek, from which he subsequently diverted it for his use. 72 In essence, he argued he had created new
73
water and was entitled to divert it.
The Ryan Court concluded that if evidence showed that the lake water,
"however small in volume, reaches the creek by reasonably ascertainable
channels, it is one of its sources of supply."' 74 To defeat the plaintiffs
claim, the defendant must prove that, "if uninterrupted, the flow finds its
way into the creek by a defined channel either upon the surface or under64. Leonard, 28 P. at 459.
65. In Hilger v. Zabel, 98 P. 881, 881 (Mont. 1909), a case similarly lacking in citation to Montana
case law (and also lacking any scientific evidence), the Court made passing reference to conveyance of
water by "subterranean channel" to surface expression as a spring. Hydrologic science has yet to cast its
imprint on Montana groundwater law.
66. Ryan v. Quinlan, 124 P. 512 (Mont. 1912).
67. Id. at 514.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 513.
70. Id. at 515.
71. Id. at 514.
72. Ryan, 124 P. at 514.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 515.
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ground" and the plaintiff's diversion of it diminishes the flow of water in
the creek. 75 The Court noted:
[After water] seeps into the earth, it mingles with the soil and remains suspended therein, or moves through it either by percolation, thus losing its identity as a flowing stream, or passes away by one or more defined channels....
It has been settled by a long line of decisions that percolating water is not
governed by the same rules that are applied to running streams. 'The secret,
changeable, and uncontrollable character of underground water in its operations is so diverse and uncertain that we cannot well subject it to the regulations of law, nor build upon it a system of rules, as is done in the case of
surface streams ....[which, unlike groundwater, have] no secret influences
move them ....We think the practical uncertainties which must ever attend
subterranean waters is reason enough why it should not be attempted to subject them to certain and fixed rules of law, and that it is better to leave them to
be enjoyed absolutely by the owner of the land as one of its natural advan..76
tages, and in the eye of the law a part of it
Accordingly, as of 1912, while the surface estate owner was entitled to
unregulated use of "percolating" water taken from under his land, the State
had a legitimate interest in regulating "seepage" water under the same
land. 77 The Court recognized that "[s]ubsurface water flowing in defined
channels reasonably ascertainable is subject to the same rules as water flowing in surface streams; but there is no presumption that any subsurface
water, in whatever form it may be found, is tributary to any stream. ' 78
Rather, it must be proven by the introduction of substantial evidence, which
the Ryan Court noted was "remarkable for what it fails to show rather than
what it does show,' 79 and, therefore, the Court directed a new trial. While
establishing no new substantive law, and perpetuating the old dichotomy,
the case might have prompted more stringent scientific analysis of future
groundwater disputes.
When finally presented with scientific groundwater evidence, the
Montana Supreme Court embraced it. Perkins v. Kramer80 marked Montana's transformation to the progressive, science-based treatment of groundwater. The dispute in Perkins started in 1921 as yet another dispute over
water rights in Dempsey Creek. 81 Under an early decree, Perkins diverted a
fork of Dempsey Creek during spring runoff into natural depressions, or
"potholes," located on a plateau. 82 During the summer months, the water
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id. (citing Chatfield v. Wilson, 28 Vt. 49 (1855)).
Id. at 515-516.
Ryan, 124 P. at 516.
Id.at515.

80. Perkins v.Kramer, 423 P.2d 587 (Mont. 1966).
81. See generally Albert W. Stone, The Long Count on Dempsey Creek: No Final Decision on
Water Right Adjudication, 31 Mont. L. Rev. 1 (1969).

82. Perkins, 423 P.2d at 588.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2009

9

230

Montana Law Review, Vol. 70 [2009], Iss. 2, Art. 2

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

Vol. 70

would percolate into the ground. 83 Perkins would capture the water in
ditches, and the water would run back into the creek after being "measured." 84 That amount of water, "less shrinkage" (presumably evaporation
85
and canal seepage), was diverted by Perkins further downstream.
By 1950, time and additional Dempsey Creek water users came into
play, necessitating a court-appointed water commissioner to address a dispute over the "seepage" water.86 The commissioner undertook daily measurement of the seepage water using then-modem hydrologic measurement
technology. 87 The Court identified the real issue to be whether Mr. Perkins
had satisfied the burden of proving that the seepage water at issue came
from his "potholes."8 8 According to testimony of a "qualified geological
engineer," significantly more seepage water was available than the potholes
could possibly contain, thereby demonstrating, inter alia, an independent
89
groundwater contribution.
The Perkins Court found that "[m]odem hydrologic innovations have
permitted more accurate tracing of groundwater movement" and "traditional legal distinctions between surface and groundwater should not be rigidly maintained when the reason for the distinction no longer exists." 90 The
Court opened the door for the eventual dissolution of the "artifice" of nonconjunctive water management.
Subsequently, in a case questioning ownership of water under state
school trust lands, the Court found, "[s]ubject to Title 85, Chapter 2, Part 5
MCA, groundwater appropriated and used on State land should be treated
no differently than surface waters appropriated and used on those lands.
The Montana Constitution ...and the Montana Water Use Act... make no
distinction between ground water and other water rights." 9 ' Finding thus,
the Court held that Montana, not a lessee, retains title, while a lessee is
entitled to a water-use right appurtenant to the land. 92 More significantly,
however, the Court recognized the concept of conjunctive management of
surface water and groundwater under the Act. 93
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 589.
87. Id.
88. Perkins, 423 P.2d at 590.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 591.
91. Dept. of St. Lands v. Pettibone, 702 P.2d 948, 957 (Mont. 1985).
92. Appellants urged the Court to find a Winters-type federal reserved right for the state sections,
which the Court declined to do, adhering to state-based water law instead. Id. In a special concurring
opinion, Justice Morrison regretted any reference to Winters, fearing it may "effect the adjudication of
Indian water rights." Id. at 958.
93. Id. at 951.
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The volume and flow of groundwater is not the only concern for people living in rural Montana. 94 Montanans are entitled to a constitutionally
protected "clean and healthful environment. ' 95 Montana EnvironmentalInformation Center v. Department of Environmental Quality involved environmental permitting of groundwater dewatering and discharge, as well as a
mining company's underground injection proposal for the upper drainage of
the Blackfoot River in Western Montana. 96 In essence, the company sought
to pump groundwater from the mine site and to dispose of it by re-injection
into groundwater "mixing zones" near the Blackfoot River. 97 A "mixing
zone" is "a portion of the aquifer receiving discharge where water quality
standards may be exceeded in order to allow mixing with the receiving
water"-here, the Blackfoot River. 98 Various studies demonstrated the
groundwater at the pump sites contained arsenic at levels exceeding water
quality standards. 99
However, as measured in the river below the mixing zones, arsenic

concentrations were lower than Montana's surface water and groundwater
standards, yet higher than concentrations in the receiving river water. 100
The Court concluded that the constitutional right to a clean and healthful
environment was implicated because arsenic is a known carcinogen, and the
addition of a known carcinogen in concentrations "greater than the concentrations of those parameters in the receiving waters has a significant impact," 10 1 which requires environmental review even if a strict water quality
10 2
standard has not been violated.
Prior to the 1972 Montana Constitution's guarantee of a clean and
healthful environment, Nelson v. C & C Plywood Corporation effectively
guaranteed Montanans that same right through tort law. 10 3 In Nelson, the
plaintiffs built their lives around a small farm in a rural, residential portion
of Flathead County. 104 They relied for years on shallow groundwater wells
94. Even the question of when groundwater becomes surface water is a bit unclear. The right of the
public to fish Mitchell Slough, a component of the Bitterroot River, was based in part upon the Court's
review of hydrologic evidence that groundwater was a significant contributor to the surface flow of the
Slough. Some of that groundwater was originally surface water applied for irrigation. BitterrootRiver
Protective Assn. v. Bitterroot Conserv. Dist., 198 P.3d 219, 223-224 (Mont. 2008).
95. Mont. Env. Info. Ctr. v. Dept. of Env. Quality, 988 P.2d 1236, 1246 (Mont. 1999); Mont. Const.
art. II, § 3.
96. Mont. Env. Info. Ctr., 988 P.2d at 1237.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 1238.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1249.
Mont. Env. Info. Ctr., 988 P.2d at 1249.
Nelson v. C & C Plywood Corp., 465 P.2d 314, 323-324 (Mont. 1970).
104. Id. at 315.
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for domestic use and farming with no water quality issues.10 5 Subsequently, a plywood manufacturing company commenced production adjacent to the Nelsons' property and caused the disposal of glue waste in a
surface water drainage that crossed the Nelsons' property.' 0 6 Tracing the
role of science in the developing law of groundwater-from Ryan v. Quinlan 10 7 to Perkins v. Kramer'08 -the

Supreme Court reviewed studies of the

local hydrology and groundwater quality10 9 and concluded the plywood
plant caused the groundwater pollution as a "continuing temporary nuisance.", 10
B.

Federal Groundwater Law in Montana and Elsewhere

Soon after the Montana Supreme Court decided Perkins, the Montana
federal district court addressed the nature of groundwater on the Blackfeet
Indian Reservation in Tweedy v. Texas Company."' At issue was the ownership of groundwater under fee title land owned by a non-Indian on the
Blackfeet Indian Reservation.' 1 2 Because the surface estate in Tweedy was
contained within the exterior boundaries of the Blackfeet Indian Reservation, the water ownership analysis began with a look at federal Indian
law.'1 3 The court reasoned that when the Blackfeet Indian Reservation was
created, "the waters of the reservation were reserved for the benefit of the
reservation lands."' 1 4 Basing this premise on the Winters ruling, and noting
that Winters dealt only with surface water, the court concluded:
[T]he same implications which led the Supreme Court to hold that surface
waters had been reserved would apply to underground waters as well. The
land was arid-water would make it more useful, and whether the waters
were found on the surface of the land or under it should make no difference. "15

Carrying this thought further, the Tweedy court noted that the prior appropriation doctrine "increasingly is being applied to underground waters." 116
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Ryan, 124 P. 512.
108. Perkins, 423 P.2d 587.
109. Nelson, 465 P.2d at 320-321.
110. Id. at 325.
111. Tweedy v. Texas Co., 286 F. Supp. 383, 385 (D. Mont. 1968).
112. Id. at 383.
113. Id. at 385.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 386 (citing Robert Emmet Clark, Ground Water Legislation in Light of Experience in the
Western States, 22 Mont. L. Rev. 42 (1960)).
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The Tweedy court relied on United States v. Mclntire,t l7 an Indian
water law case arising on the Flathead Indian Reservation, to reach the conclusion that an Indian-reserved right can apply to groundwater, as well as
surface water.1 18 The Mclntire court, in turn, relied on Winters and an analysis of the Treaty of Hellgate t 1 9 for the rule that the waters of Flathead
Reservation's creeks were "impliedly reserved by the treaty to the Indians." 12 0 The Mclntire findings on the nature of the Winters rights on the
Flathead Indian Reservation were reconfirmed in United States v. Alexander, another Flathead case, when the court stated: "The treaty impliedly
12 1
reserved all waters on the Reservation to the Indians."'
A more narrowly applied version of the reserved rights doctrine also
applies in a non-Indian setting, such as within United States Forest Service
lands. 12 2 It also applies to Devil's Hole National Monument, a federal land
123
withdrawal to preserve an endangered species called the desert pupfish.
1 24
The pupfish survived in one spring-fed pool in the American Southwest.
The United States sought to protect that pool by creating a federal reservation of land surrounding it to protect the water supply necessary to sustain
the fish. 12 5 A conflict arose when nearby agricultural interests drilled
groundwater wells that caused a drawdown of the water available to the
desert pupfish, rendering it unable to spawn. 126 The United States sought to
enjoin the well production to serve the purpose for which the federal reservation was created-to preserve a spawning population of pupfish.12 7 The
Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Cappaert128 relied on Winters
and Tweedy to conclude that "the United States may reserve not only surface water, but also groundwater" to satisfy the purposes of a federal reser29
vation.'
The Ninth Circuit Cappaertdecision was unanimously affirmed by the
Supreme Court's decision in Cappaert v. United States.130 The Supreme
Court noted:
117. U.S. v. Mclntire, 101 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1939).
118. Tweedy, 286 F. Supp. at 385 (citing Mclntire, 101 F.2d 650).
119. The Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes reserved the Flathead Indian Reservation as their
exclusive homeland in the Treaty with the Flatheads. Treaty of Hellgate, 12 stat. 975 (July 16, 1855).
120. McIntire, 101 F.2d at 653 (citing Winters, 207 U.S. at 577; Treaty of Hellgate, 12 stat. at
975-976).
121. U.S. v. Alexander, 131 F.2d 359, 360 (9th Cir. 1942).
122. U.S. v. N.M., 438 U.S. 696, 707 (1978).
123. Cappaert v. U.S., 426 U.S. 128, 132 (1976).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 132, 136.
126. Id. at 134-135.
127. Id. at 135.
128. U.S. v. Capparet, 508 F.2d 313 (9th Cir. 1974).
129. Id. at 317 (citing Winters, 207 U.S. 564; Tweedy, 286 F. Supp. 383).
130. Capparet,426 U.S. at 138.
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This Court has long held that when the Federal Government withdraws its
land from the public domain and reserves it for a federal purpose, the Government, by implication, reserves appurtenant water then unappropriated to the
extent needed to accomplish the purpose of the reservation. In so doing the
United States acquires a reserved right in the unappropriated water which
of the reservation and is superior to the rights of future
vests on the date
13 1
appropriators.
The immutable conclusion reached by the Supreme Court in Cappaert is
that "since the implied reservation-of-water-rights doctrine is based upon
the necessity of water for the purpose of the federal reservation, we hold
that the United States can protect its water from subsequent diversion,
1 32
whether the diversion is of surface or ground water."
One thing is clear in the field of federally reserved water rights: they
encompass surface and groundwater necessary to satisfy the purposes for
which the lands are reserved. Groundwater and surface water constitute "a
unitary resource.... [t]he actions of one user have an immediate and direct
133
effect on other users."
C.

Indian Reserved Water Rights Include Groundwater

The Montana Supreme Court's decision in Confederated Salish and
Kootenai Tribes v. Stults was the third in a series of four cases between the
Tribes and the Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation
(DNRC). Each of the cases involved the State's permitting of post-1973,
new water uses on the Flathead Indian Reservation. These four cases will
be collectively referred to as Ciotti I through IV. 134 In Ciotti I the Court
held that "given the nature of Indian reserved water rights,"'135 the DNRC
lacked the authority to permit new water uses on the reservation until the
Tribes' senior and "pervasive"' 36 reserved and aboriginal water rights were
finally quantified, either by negotiation with the Commission or through a
1 37
McCarran-qualifying general adjudication.
In each of the four Ciotti cases the Tribes' argument remained the
same. Montana's new water use permitting statute1 3 8 required DNRC to
make a finding that, inter alia, issuing a new water use permit would cause
131. Id.
132. Id. at 143.
133. Mont. v. Env. Protec. Agency, 137 F.3d 1135, 1142 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 921
(1998) (quoting Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 52 (9th Cir. 1981)).
134. Ciotti 1, 923 P.2d 1073; Ciotti H, 992 P.2d 244; Ciotti III, 59 P.3d 1093; ConfederatedSalish &
Kootenai Tribes v. Clinch, 158 P.3d 377 (Mont. 2007) [hereinafter Ciotti IV].
135. Ciotti 1, 923 P.2d at 1080.
136. Id. at 1079.
137. Id. at 1080.
138. Mont. Code Ann. § 85-2-311.
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no adverse impact to senior water rights. 139 The Tribes' undeniably senior
reserved and aboriginal water rights-rights protected under federal lawhad not yet been quantified either by a compact or by general water rights
adjudication. 140 Therefore, lacking the ability to measure the impact (adverse or otherwise) to a pervasive, senior, yet unquantified right, the DNRC
simply could not make the finding of no adverse impact required by the

permitting statute. 141
The earlier Ciotti cases arose out of the DNRC's surface water permitting under Montana Code Annotated Section 85-2-311.142 That statute
treats surface and groundwater similarly for certain post-1973 permitting
purposes. 14 3 The Courts' injunctions did not distinguish between surface
and groundwater permitting. 144 Rather, they enjoined DNRC from permitting any water use on the reservation because the Tribes' senior rights had
not been quantified and, again, the DNRC possessed no way to make the
required statutory finding of no adverse effect necessary to issue a new
145
water use permit.
In the build-up to Ciotti III, DNRC tried to permit a new groundwater
use on the Flathead Indian Reservation on the theory that the previous Ciotti decisions did not expressly bar it from permitting groundwater uses,
which remained a proper exercise of DNRC authority on the Flathead Indian Reservation. 14 6 In Ciotti III, the Montana Supreme Court again enjoined the DNRC from permitting any water use on the Flathead Indian
Reservation.1 47 The Court recognized
[n]o reason to limit the scope of our prior holdings by excluding groundwater
from the Tribes' federally reserved water rights in this case. The Legislature
has created the Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission, a
body charged with the difficult task of quantifying and negotiating Indian
available to
reserved water rights. Quantifying the amount of groundwater
148
the Tribes is simply another component of that inquiry.
The Court, building on the Gila River decision and federal case law discussed above, concluded that "[t]he significant question for the purpose of
the reserved water rights doctrine is not whether the water runs above or
139. Id. at § 85-2-311(1)(b).
140. Ciotti 1,923 P.2d at 1080; Ciotti H,992 P.2d at 250; Ciotti Ii, 59 P.3d at 1098; Ciotti IV, 158
P.3d at 389.
141. Id.
992 P.2d at 246.
142. Ciotti 1, 923 P.2d at 1076 n. 1; Ciotti 11,
143. For example, domestic use of groundwater is exempt from the permit and filing provisions of
the statute. Mont. Code Ann. § 85-2-222.
144. Ciotti 1, 923 P.2d at 1080; Ciotti II, 992 P.2d at 250.
145. Id.
146. Ciotti III, 59 P.3d at 1095.
147. Id. at 1101.
148. Id. at 1099.
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below the ground but whether it is necessary to accomplish the purpose of
the reservation."' 1 49 In Montana, as in Arizona, groundwater is an integral
component of Indian reserved water rights and will be used to serve the
many purposes for which Indian reservations were established.
D.

The Montana Trout Unlimited Case: Surface and
Groundwater Connectivity

The Montana Supreme Court solidified its adherence to the hydrology
of groundwater in Montana Trout Unlimited v. Montana Department of
Natural Resources and Conservation.150 The Court expanded its prior analysis of the interrelated nature of surface water and groundwater while fo15 1
cusing on a statutory basin closure in the upper Missouri River drainage.
Under that closure, the DNRC generally is prohibited from permitting any
new water use within the basin until a final decree in the adjudication of
pre-1973 water rights has been issued. 152 However, the basin closure statute contains several exceptions to the prohibition. For example, the DNRC
can issue new permits for groundwater not "immediately or directly connected" to surface water. 153 Notably, the Legislature did not define these
1 55
terms.' 54 That was left to the DNRC's rulemaking.
The Smith River is a tributary to the Missouri River within the basin
closure area, and is therefore subject to the closure. 156 The DNRC hydrologic studies, completed in 2003, noted that the Smith and its tributaries are
hydrologically connected to the groundwater in two ways. 157 First, pumping wells might intercept groundwater before it reaches the surface
water.' 5 8 This is called "prestream capture."' 159 Second, pumping groundwater may draw water from the surface-water body by a process called
"induced filtration."'] 60 The DNRC promulgated rules that attempted to define the statutory language by prohibiting the permitting of water "immediately or directly connected" to surface waters.' 61 However, the rule only
149. Id.
150. Mont. Trout Unlimited, 133 P.3d at 231.
151. Id. at 226.
152. Mont. Code Ann. § 85-2-343.
153. Id. at § 85-2-342(2). After the Montana Trout Unlimited Court's decision, the 2007 Montana
Legislature amended the statute by simply deleting any reference to groundwater, regardless of connectivity. Science has some up-front costs-politics does not.
154. Mont. Trout Unlimited, 133 P.3d at 227.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 226.
157. Id. at 232.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 226-227.
160. Mont. Trout Unlimited, 133 P.3d at 227.
161. Id.
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addressed one of the two types of groundwater-capture identified in the
DNRC's study of induced filtration. 16 2 The rule was silent on the DNRC's
duty to evaluate possible impacts to surface water by pre-stream capture. 163
Regardless, the DNRC proposed to process permits for new groundwater
64
use near the Smith River in the closed basin.'
Trout Unlimited sued to prohibit the DNRC from processing applications for groundwater near the Smith River before the agency completed a
thorough analysis of whether or not surface water and groundwater in the
Smith drainage were "immediately or directly connected."' 165 The Supreme
Court focused on that statutory language and the DNRC's interpretive rule
in a standard administrative law analysis.166 First, the Court observed that
agency rules must be consistent with the statute they are designed to implement. 167 Second, the Court found that, as a general rule, courts should defer to long-standing agency interpretations of unclear statutes. 168 Third, the
Court noted that agency rules, while instructive, do not bind a court, particularly if the agency has no long-standing track record of implementing the
rule. 169 The Court found the rule flawed as a matter of law because it addressed only one of two ways recognized by the DNRC studies in which
groundwater might immediately or directly connect to surface water.' 7 0
As in Perkins v. Kramer forty years earlier, the Montana Trout Unlimited Court supported the reality of the hydrologic cycle. It concluded that
the agency's failure to fully recognize the interrelated nature of surface and
groundwater was bad science. 17 1 While the Legislature confirmed the unitary nature of water resources, the agency chose to recognize only immediate connections to surface flow caused by induced filtration and to ignore
the less immediate, but no less direct, impact of pre-stream capture of tributary groundwater. 172 The Court concluded by observing that basin closures
generally serve a valid legislative purpose-to protect senior water rights
claimants from juniors. 7 3 In the eyes of the Montana Supreme Court, "[i]t
makes no difference to senior appropriators whether groundwater pumping
reduces surface flows because of induced filtration or from prestream cap162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Mont. Trout Unlimited, 133 P.3d at 228.
167. Id. at 231.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 232.
171. Id.
172. Mont. Trout Unlimited, 133 P.3d at 232.
173. Id.
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ture of tributary groundwater. The end result is the same: less surface flow
17 4
in direct contravention of the legislature's intent."
IV.

CONCLUSION

The 1972 Montana Constitution addresses water in a systematic and
nearly comprehensive manner, although it failed to acknowledge federally
reserved and aboriginal water rights. A decade earlier in Perkins v.
Kramer, the Montana Supreme Court nearly established a systematic approach to surface and groundwater. 175 In this respect Montana leads other
Western states in applying science to the conjunctive analysis of surface
water and groundwater disputes.
Montana's historic practice of allowing surface estate owners to appropriate groundwater without regard to adverse effects on other consumptive
uses and stream flows lies in the past. The Montana Supreme Court is
clear: using sound science to unravel the "practical uncertainties" associated
with discerning the interrelationship of groundwater and surface water is an
essential predicate for evaluating developments that may impact a unitary
resource. As the Legislature's response to the Montana Trout Unlimited
decision suggests, Montana's legislative and executive branches will be
challenged to preserve the role of science when, as in the state of Arizona,
water begins to substantially limit economic growth.

174. Id.
175. Perkins, 423 P.2d 587.
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